

SECRETDCI/RM 2027-80
19 December 1980

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
D/DCI/RM

25X1 VIA: [REDACTED]
AD/PAO

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
PAO

SUBJECT: End-of-Contract Assessment for the Study: NFIP Support
to Contingency Forces

REFERENCE: PAO Staff Memorandum No. 7, dated 6 October 1980, on
Termination of Contractual Arrangement

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2. Background

The request for contractor assistance to study NFIP support to contingency forces was initiated by PAO to provide a more in-depth look at problem areas identified in the RMS Air/Land Support to Operating Forces (STOF) Study of July 1979. The original objective of the study, as described in the study prospectus of 14 December 1979, was to identify and assess alternatives for making NFIP resources and procedures more responsive to the needs of military forces in planning and executing contingency operations. The proposed approach, outlined in the prospectus, was to:

"(1) identify representative contingency operations. To do this we will initially examine previous contingency operations and identify ways to categorize them (e.g., by geographical region, kind of operations, force deficiencies, critical problems, significant political-military events preceding the crisis).

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(2) identify information needs for each category-of-operation and operational phase by examining post mortems, interviewing representatives of organizations involved in past incidents, and reviewing current planning procedures.

(3) assess how well these needs can be satisfied with current intelligence assets. This will include looking at needs that historically have not been satisfied and estimating whether the capabilities of current and planned NFIP and IRA systems are still deficient in satisfying them.

(4) estimate the impact of these remaining information shortfalls on overall mission performance. Impacts need not be estimated precisely but should provide a basis for ranking shortfalls in a rough priority order.

(5) for those shortfalls that are most serious and prevalent, suggest ways to alleviate them (including new collection requirements, or better procedures for processing, analyzing, and disseminating existing information) that can be achieved using NFIP resources and estimate their costs. Costs of relevant initiatives already being considered in the FY82 budget can be easily determined; cost estimates for new solutions will require participation by the cognizant program manager." (S)

In retrospect, the study accomplished the overall objectives, and the approach actually used generally followed that proposed. The most significant problems encountered in conducting the study were in gathering detailed information on tactical intelligence needs and the utilization of national assets based on actual contingency operations. This was due to a combination of :

- no post-mortems being available in some instances,
- DoD sensitivities to ICS and contractor access to reports that did exist, and
- NSC rules prohibiting contractor access to its records. (S)

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Of those reports on actual operations that were made available, some commented on general shortfalls in intelligence support, but many made no references to tactical intelligence. As a result of these restrictions, the information contained in the study was based more on personal interviews than originally anticipated. (S)

3. Impact of Report

Based on comments received on interim drafts, the report has generally been well received within the community. It has focused community attention on specific, cross-program problems that currently constrain intelligence support to a mission which will likely become more important in the next few years. In addition, the study was the basis for a decision paper written during Program Review which resulted in the reranking and inclusion in the FY82 budget of a number of GDIP, CCP, and CIAP packages [redacted] that might otherwise have been ignored (see Annex 7 of the report for a listing of the packages). (S)

4. Status of Recommendations

A complete list of recommendations is included in Chapter V of the report. The DCI's FY83-87 Guidance will assign responsibilities to the program managers for follow-up actions on selected recommendations with resource implications. For example, the GDIP program manager is asked in Guidance to take the community lead and report progress to the DCI by next June in the following areas:

- working with the RDJTF and the Services to define a prioritized set of minimum essential information needs for supporting contingency force planning and execution,
- identifying shortfalls in community data base holdings and dissemination techniques which inhibit satisfaction of these needs, and
- investigating the value and cost of establishing a point of contact that could provide complete services for tactical organizations requesting national-level support. (S)

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In addition, RMS is committed, via Guidance, to continue monitoring resource initiatives proposed to improve contingency support and to highlight for the DCI in the FY83 Program and Budget reviews those proposals judged most promising. Finally, PAO plans to work with community representatives to determine the feasibility of maintaining a Crisis Area Watch List like that proposed in the study which could be used by the community to focus limited collection and production resources on likely crisis spots. (S)

5. Disposition of Report

The final report is being distributed to the addressees listed in Annex 9 of the study. Unless specifically requested by them, distribution to Congressional committees is not recommended. (S)

6. Final Observations

Among the "lessons learned" from monitoring this contract are the following:

o the amount of time required to monitor a contract is easily underestimated. I had originally estimated that about 40 percent of my time would be required; in actuality about 70 percent was required. This was due in part to the breadth of the study, the large number of DoD and intelligence organizations involved, and the fact that much of the information needed was available only through personal interviews. I spent a large amount of time contacting organizations, describing the study, alleviating sensitivities about why the Resource Management Staff was studying this area, establishing contractor clearances, etc. In addition, I accompanied the SPC analysts on all initial interviews, played an active role in developing the study outline, and helped rewrite portions of the report. In my opinion, this level of participation was necessary to ensure the final product was relevant and useful.

o analysts were flexible and conscientious in responding to guidance, they were concerned about the quality of the final product, and they were willing to expend the extra effort required to meet deadlines. (S)

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